[prev in list] [next in list] [prev in thread] [next in thread] 

List:       fedora-devel-list
Subject:    Re: Restricting automounting of uncommon filesystems?
From:       "Smith, Stewart via devel" <devel () lists ! fedoraproject ! org>
Date:       2023-07-30 19:21:44
Message-ID: 3BDF5825-E415-45B1-B5E3-18CBB46CAE2E () amazon ! com
[Download RAW message or body]

[Attachment #2 (text/plain)]


On Jul 24, 2023, at 12:11 PM, Eric Sandeen <sandeen@redhat.com> wrote:

And frankly that is some of my motivation to find an improvement here. A
small cadre of filesystem developers are near the breaking point trying
to keep up with an army of machines running syzkaller.

There's also a large flow-on effect to those running production systems and what they \
have to patch and at what pace.

In the current model, where we enable the NTFS (or BeFS, or UFS, or HFS, or whatever) \
file system, every time that has some CVE, we get to release a security advisory \
saying "everybody go update your kernels" and for 99.99% of users, it's code they \
don't use, and don't *want* to even ever have loaded. The CIS Hardening Benchmarks \
all start with "blacklist modules for file systems you don't need", and module \
blacklisting is both not an ideal name for the functionality, and not exactly a \
foolproof method.

For a lot of users we are currently:
- likely making them patch needlessly, as it's code they don't rely on
- or training them that Important security updates aren't actually always Important, \
and maybe they can not pay attention to them.

I *really* dislike the latter. The clarity of "you have this software installed, \
there is an Important update to it, this means you must update within X time" is \
wonderful.

One idea we've been throwing around is to put all the non-essential (i.e. everything \
but vfat and xfs) file system modules in a different subpackage, and sign the modules \
with a different key, and not trusting that key by default. Thus we could issue \
security advisories just for that subpackage, as well as clearly state the level of \
trust one should place in the code in question.

Combine that with a libguestfs approach with a separate kernel package for its guest, \
and lazy people like me could probably not have to reboot their laptop/desktop as \
often, while simultaneously being more protected from random malicious flash drives.


[Attachment #3 (text/html)]

<html>
<head>
<meta http-equiv="Content-Type" content="text/html; charset=utf-8">
</head>
<body style="overflow-wrap: break-word; -webkit-nbsp-mode: space; line-break: \
after-white-space;"> <br>
<div>
<blockquote type="cite">
<div>On Jul 24, 2023, at 12:11 PM, Eric Sandeen &lt;sandeen@redhat.com&gt; \
wrote:</div> <div><br style="caret-color: rgb(0, 0, 0); font-family: Helvetica; \
font-size: 12px; font-style: normal; font-variant-caps: normal; font-weight: 400; \
letter-spacing: normal; text-align: start; text-indent: 0px; text-transform: none; \
white-space: normal; word-spacing: 0px; -webkit-text-stroke-width: 0px; \
text-decoration: none;"> <span style="caret-color: rgb(0, 0, 0); font-family: \
Helvetica; font-size: 12px; font-style: normal; font-variant-caps: normal; \
font-weight: 400; letter-spacing: normal; text-align: start; text-indent: 0px; \
text-transform: none; white-space: normal; word-spacing: 0px; \
-webkit-text-stroke-width: 0px; text-decoration: none; float: none; display: inline \
!important;">And  frankly that is some of my motivation to find an improvement here. \
A</span><br style="caret-color: rgb(0, 0, 0); font-family: Helvetica; font-size: \
12px; font-style: normal; font-variant-caps: normal; font-weight: 400; \
letter-spacing: normal; text-align: start; text-indent: 0px; text-transform: none; \
white-space: normal; word-spacing: 0px; -webkit-text-stroke-width: 0px; \
text-decoration: none;"> <span style="caret-color: rgb(0, 0, 0); font-family: \
Helvetica; font-size: 12px; font-style: normal; font-variant-caps: normal; \
font-weight: 400; letter-spacing: normal; text-align: start; text-indent: 0px; \
text-transform: none; white-space: normal; word-spacing: 0px; \
-webkit-text-stroke-width: 0px; text-decoration: none; float: none; display: inline \
!important;">small  cadre of filesystem developers are near the breaking point \
trying</span><br style="caret-color: rgb(0, 0, 0); font-family: Helvetica; font-size: \
12px; font-style: normal; font-variant-caps: normal; font-weight: 400; \
letter-spacing: normal; text-align: start; text-indent: 0px; text-transform: none; \
white-space: normal; word-spacing: 0px; -webkit-text-stroke-width: 0px; \
text-decoration: none;"> <span style="caret-color: rgb(0, 0, 0); font-family: \
Helvetica; font-size: 12px; font-style: normal; font-variant-caps: normal; \
font-weight: 400; letter-spacing: normal; text-align: start; text-indent: 0px; \
text-transform: none; white-space: normal; word-spacing: 0px; \
-webkit-text-stroke-width: 0px; text-decoration: none; float: none; display: inline \
!important;">to  keep up with an army of machines running syzkaller.</span><br>
</div>
</blockquote>
<br>
</div>
<div>There's also a large flow-on effect to those running production systems and what \
they have to patch and at what pace.</div> <div><br>
</div>
<div>In the current model, where we enable the NTFS (or BeFS, or UFS, or HFS, or \
whatever) file system, every time that has some CVE, we get to release a security \
advisory saying "everybody go update your kernels" and for 99.99% of users, it's code \
they don't  use, and don't *want* to even ever have loaded. The CIS Hardening \
Benchmarks all start with "blacklist modules for file systems you don't need", and \
module blacklisting is both not an ideal name for the functionality, and not exactly \
a foolproof method.</div> <div><br>
</div>
<div>For a lot of users we are currently:</div>
<div>- likely making them patch needlessly, as it's code they don't rely on</div>
<div>- or training them that Important security updates aren't actually always \
Important, and maybe they can not pay attention to them.</div> <div><br>
</div>
<div>I *really* dislike the latter. The clarity of "you have this software installed, \
there is an Important update to it, this means you must update within X time" is \
wonderful.</div> <div><br>
</div>
<div>One idea we've been throwing around is to put all the non-essential (i.e. \
everything but vfat and xfs) file system modules in a different subpackage, and sign \
the modules with a different key, and not trusting that key by default. Thus we could \
issue security  advisories just for that subpackage, as well as clearly state the \
level of trust one should place in the code in question.</div> <div><br>
</div>
<div>Combine that with a libguestfs approach with a separate kernel package for its \
guest, and lazy people like me could probably not have to reboot their laptop/desktop \
as often, while simultaneously being more protected from random malicious flash \
drives.</div> </body>
</html>


[Attachment #4 (unknown)]

_______________________________________________
devel mailing list -- devel@lists.fedoraproject.org
To unsubscribe send an email to devel-leave@lists.fedoraproject.org
Fedora Code of Conduct: https://docs.fedoraproject.org/en-US/project/code-of-conduct/
List Guidelines: https://fedoraproject.org/wiki/Mailing_list_guidelines
List Archives: https://lists.fedoraproject.org/archives/list/devel@lists.fedoraproject.org
Do not reply to spam, report it: https://pagure.io/fedora-infrastructure/new_issue


[prev in list] [next in list] [prev in thread] [next in thread] 

Configure | About | News | Add a list | Sponsored by KoreLogic