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List:       bitcoin-dev
Subject:    [bitcoin-dev] Forcenet: an experimental network with a new header format
From:       tier.nolan () gmail ! com (Tier Nolan)
Date:       2016-12-14 16:26:58
Message-ID: CAE-z3OXeV34SbE4AKknOVVcwEGDq22WO4iqfkQ2v3DCen1sP-Q () mail ! gmail ! com
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On Wed, Dec 14, 2016 at 3:45 PM, Johnson Lau <jl2012 at xbt.hk> wrote:

> I think that?s too much tech debt just for softforkability.
> 
> The better way would be making the sum tree as an independent tree with a
> separate commitment, and define a special type of softfork (e.g. a special
> BIP9 bit).
> 

One of the problems with fraud proofs is withholding by miners.  It is
important that proof of publication/archive nodes check that the miners are
actually publishing their blocks.

If you place the data in another tree, then care needs to be taken that the
merkle path information can be obtained for that tree.

If an SPV node asks for a run of transactions from an archive node, then
the archive node can give the merkle branch for all of those transactions.
The archive node inherently has to check that tree.

The question is if there is a way to show that data is not available, but
without opening up the network to DOS.  If enough people run full nodes
then this isn't a problem.

> 
> When the softfork is activated, the legacy full node will stop validating
> the sum tree. This doesn?t really degrade the security by more than a
> normal softfork, as the legacy full node would still validate the total
> weight and nSigOp based on its own rules. The only purpose of the sum tree
> is to help SPV nodes to validate. This way we could even completely
> redefine the structure and data committed in the sum tree.
> 

Seems reasonable.  I think the soft-fork would have to have a timeout
before actually activating.  That would give SPV clients time to switch
over.

That could happen before the vote though, so it isn't essential.  The SPV
clients would have to support both trees and then switch mode.  Ensuring
that SPV nodes actually bother would be helped by proving that the network
actually intends to soft fork.

The SPV client just has to check that every block has at least one of the
commitments that it accepts so that it can understand fraud proofs.


> 
> I?d like to combine the size weight and sigOp weight, but not sure if we
> could. The current size weight limit is 4,000,000 and sigop limit is
> 80,000. It?s 50:1. If we maintain this ratio, and define
> weight = n * (total size +  3 * base size) + sigop , with n = 50
> a block may have millions of sigops which is totally unacceptable.
> 

You multiplied by the wrong term.

weight = total size +  3 * base size + n * sigop , with n = 50

weight for max block = 8,000,000

That gives a maximum of 8,000,000 / 50 = 160,000 sigops.

To get that you would need zero transaction length.  You could get close if
you have transactions that just repeat OP_CHECKSIG over and over (or maybe
something with OP_CHECKMULTISIG).


> 
> On the other hand, if we make n too low, we may allow either too few
> sigop, or a too big block size.
> 
> Signature aggregation will make this a bigger problem as one signature may
> spend thousands of sigop
> 
> 
> 
> On 14 Dec 2016, at 20:52, Tier Nolan <tier.nolan at gmail.com> wrote:
> 
> 
> 
> On Wed, Dec 14, 2016 at 10:55 AM, Johnson Lau <jl2012 at xbt.hk> wrote:
> 
> > In a sum tree, however, since the nSigOp is implied, any redefinition
> > requires either a hardfork or a new sum tree (and the original sum tree
> > becomes a placebo for old nodes. So every softfork of this type creates a
> > new tree)
> > 
> 
> That's a good point.
> 
> 
> > The only way to fix this is to explicitly commit to the weight and
> > nSigOp, and the committed value must be equal to or larger than the real
> > value. Only in this way we could redefine it with softfork. However, that
> > means each tx will have an overhead of 16 bytes (if two int64 are used)
> > 
> 
> The weight and sigop count could be transmitted as variable length
> integers.  That would be around 2 bytes for the sigops and 3 bytes for the
> weight, per transaction.
> 
> It would mean that the block format would have to include the raw
> transaction, "extra"/tree information and witness data for each transaction.
> 
> On an unrelated note, the two costs could be combined into a unified
> cost.  For example, a sigop could have equal cost to 250 bytes.  This would
> make it easier for miners to decide what to charge.
> 
> On the other hand, CPU cost and storage/network costs are not completely
> interchangeable.
> 
> Is there anything that would need to be summed fees, raw tx size, weight
> and sigops that the greater or equal rule wouldn't cover?
> 
> On 12 Dec 2016, at 00:40, Tier Nolan via bitcoin-dev <
> bitcoin-dev at lists.linuxfoundation.org> wrote:
> 
> 
> On Sat, Dec 10, 2016 at 9:41 PM, Luke Dashjr <luke at dashjr.org> wrote:
> 
> > On Saturday, December 10, 2016 9:29:09 PM Tier Nolan via bitcoin-dev
> > wrote:
> > > Any new merkle algorithm should use a sum tree for partial validation
> > and
> > > fraud proofs.
> > 
> > PR welcome.
> > 
> 
> Fair enough.  It is pretty basic.
> 
> https://github.com/luke-jr/bips/pull/2
> 
> It sums up sigops, block size, block cost (that is "weight" right?) and
> fees.
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> 
> 
> 
> 
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