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List:       whonix-devel
Subject:    [Whonix-devel] onionbalance useful on same server / for high-spec non-location hidden servers?
From:       Patrick Schleizer <patrick-mailinglists () whonix ! org>
Date:       2020-06-03 9:24:22
Message-ID: 39f07124-4d09-a59b-90fb-8744bd51ec1c () whonix ! org
[Download RAW message or body]

Would it be useful to run multiple Tor instances and onionbalance on the
very same server? Or does that totally defeat the purpose of onionbalance?

In my case, it's not a location hidden service. Just an alternative way
to connect to a server which is available over clearnet anyhow.

I guess the presumption of onionbalance is that a location hidden server
shouldn't produce too much Tor traffic as that would be suspicious?

Is a single Tor client a bottleneck? I.e. are multiple Tor clients more
performant than only one Tor client? Does onionbalance "only" work
around limitations of individual servers in CPU / IO / bandwidth?

In other words, assume CPU / IO / bandwidth is "unlimited" on one
server. (And ignore failover.) Does it make sense to run multiple Tor
instances and onionbalance or would a single Tor instance without
onionbalance be sufficient?

Cheers,
Patrick
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