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List:       vulnwatch
Subject:    [VulnWatch] Local ZoneAlarm Firewall (probably all versions - tested on v3.1)
From:       <loper () hushmail ! com>
Date:       2003-08-05 13:36:44
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sec-labs team proudly presents:


     Local ZoneAlarm Firewall (probably all versions - tested on v3.1)

     Device Driver vulnerability.
     by Lord YuP
     04/08/2003




 I. BACKGROUND


   ZoneAlarm is a very powerful and very common nowadays firewall for

   Windows produced by Zone Labs. (http://www.zonelabs.com)




 II. DESCRIPTION


   The driver installed with ZoneAlarm is vulnerable, and can be
   exploited in cause of that attacker can gain full system control
   (ring0 privileges).


   By sending properly formatted message to the ZoneAlarm Device
   Driver (VSDATANT - TrueVector Device Driver) you can cause an
   device driver memory overwrite.

   Overview, sending faked buffors with specific singal can cause
   a miscellaneous code execution:


   First signal should be send to overwrite specific memory location,

   in the current case it can be one of the case-if-statement.


     push 0 ;overlapped
     push offset bytes_returned ;bytes returned
     push 4 ;lpOutBuffer size
     push STATMENT_INSTRUCTION_POINTER ;memory to overwrite
     push 0 ;lpInBuffer size
     push 0 ;lpInBuffer
     push 8400000fh ;guess what X-D
     push vsdatant_handle ;device handle
     call DeviceIoControl ;send it!



   If the correct STATMENT_INSTRUCTION_POINTER will be put the address

   should be overwritten to 00060001h (example). After memory
   allocation at this address (inserting shellcode bla bla bla), the

   second signal must be send to jump into inserted code. That can
   be done with sending another signal:



     LpInBuffer:
     db STATMENT_OVERWRITTEN_NUMBER ;where to jump
     db 7 dup (0) ;data?
     dd temp_buff ;temp buffer
     db 10 dup (0) ;some space


   This one should be send with another dwIoControl code, however we

   are no longer publishing any exploits, even PoC (die kiddies)


   After sending second faked message, device driver will jump
   to the STATEMENT offset which was overwritten by first "signal"



 III. IMPACT


   The after sucessfull exploitation, attacker can obtain FULL SYSTEM

   CONTROL! In the worse for attacker option, OS can fault!



 IV. REFERENCE - DEVICE DRIVER ATTACKS


   The white paper about Device Drivers Attacks can be found at
   http://sec-labs.hack.pl the papers section.




- --
sec-labs team [http://sec-labs.hack.pl]

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