'Re: [tor-talk] [tor-relays] Exit in Turkey blocking torproject (komm EA93C), BadExit, Node Subscript'

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List:       tor-talk
Subject:    Re: [tor-talk] [tor-relays] Exit in Turkey blocking torproject (komm EA93C), BadExit, Node Subscript
From:       Conrad Rockenhaus <conrad () rockenhaus ! com>
Date:       2018-08-31 21:00:30
Message-ID: 15F85186-D6E0-49A8-9C3B-A062CC95E128 () rockenhaus ! com
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Good God every conversation, now. Anyway.

This exit isn't bad exit material. Turkey has been known to block Tor though, I'm \
actually proud of this guy for having the cajones (also known as balls to those of \
you who don't habla espanol) to operate an exit in country such as Turkey, which \
absolutely hates freedom inducing technologies such as Tor. Let's give this guy (or \
gal) the atto-boy by marking the exit as a bad-exit just because stuff gets blocked \
in autocratic regimes that this operator has no control over. None, absolutely none. \
They screw with the DNS servers over there, that's why during the last uprising they \
were tagging "8.8.8.8" on the walls.

Now they're doing things a little more sophisticated. Either way, this guy gives us a \
window to see what is blocked and what isn't blocked within the Turkish thunderdome.

-Conrad

> On Aug 30, 2018, at 9:24 PM, Nathaniel Suchy <me@lunorian.is> wrote:
> 
> What if a Tor Bridge blocked connections to the tor network to selective
> client IPs? Would we keep it in BridgeDB because its sometimes useful?
> 
> On Thu, Aug 30, 2018 at 10:02 PM arisbe <arisbe@cni.net> wrote:
> 
> > Children should be seen and not herd.  The opposite goes for Tor relays.
> > Arisbe
> > 
> > 
> > On 8/30/2018 2:11 PM, Nathaniel Suchy wrote:
> > 
> > So this exit node is censored by Turkey. That means any site blocked in
> > Turkey is blocked on the exit. What about an exit node in China or Syria or
> > Iraq? They censor, should exits there be allowed? I don't think they
> > should. Make them relay only, (and yes that means no Guard or HSDir flags
> > too) situation A could happen. The odds might not be in your favor. Don't
> > risk that!
> > 
> > Cordially,
> > Nathaniel Suchy
> > 
> > On Thu, Aug 30, 2018 at 3:25 PM grarpamp <grarpamp@gmail.com> wrote:
> > 
> > > This particular case receiving mentions for at least a few months...
> > > D1E99DE1E29E05D79F0EF9E083D18229867EA93C kommissarov 185.125.33.114
> > > 
> > > The relay won't [likely] be badexited because neither it nor its upstream
> > > is
> > > shown to be doing anything malicious. Simple censorship isn't enough.
> > > And except for such limited censorship, the nodes are otherwise fully
> > > useful, and provide a valuable presence inside such regions / networks.
> > > 
> > > Users, in such censoring regimes, that have sucessfully connected
> > > to tor, already have free choice of whatever exits they wish, therefore
> > > such censorship is moot for them.
> > > 
> > > For everyone else, and them, workarounds exist such as,,,
> > > https://onion.torproject.org/
> > > http://yz7lpwfhhzcdyc5y.onion/
> > > search engines, sigs, vpns, mirrors, etc
> > > 
> > > Further, whatever gets added to static exitpolicy's might move out
> > > from underneath them or the censor, the censor may quit, or the exit
> > > may fail to maintain the exitpolicy's. None of which are true
> > > representation
> > > of the net, and are effectively censorship as result of operator action
> > > even though unintentional / delayed.
> > > 
> > > Currently many regimes do limited censorship like this,
> > > so you'd lose all those exits too for no good reason, see...
> > > https://ooni.torproject.org/
> > > 
> > > https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Internet_censorship_and_surveillance_by_country
> > > 
> > > And arbitrarily hamper spirits, tactics, and success of volunteer
> > > resistance communities and operators in, and fighting, such regimes
> > > around the world.
> > > 
> > > And if the net goes chaotic, majority of exits will have limited
> > > visibility,
> > > for which exitpolicy / badexit are hardly manageable solutions either,
> > > and would end up footshooting out many partly useful yet needed
> > > exits as well.
> > > 
> > > 
> > > If this situation bothers users, they can use... SIGNAL NEWNYM,
> > > New Identity, or ExcludeExitNodes.
> > > 
> > > They can also create, maintain and publish lists of whatever such
> > > classes of nodes they wish to determine, including various levels
> > > of trust, contactability, verification, ouija, etc... such that others
> > > can subscribe to them and Exclude at will.
> > > They can further publish patches to make tor automatically
> > > read such lists, including some modes that might narrowly exclude
> > > and route stream requests around just those lists of censored
> > > destination:exit pairings.
> > > 
> > > Ref also...
> > > https://metrics.torproject.org/rs.html#search/as:AS197328%20flag:exit
> > > https://metrics.torproject.org/rs.html#search/country:tr%20flag:exit
> > > 
> > > 
> > > In the subect situations, you'd want to show that it is in fact
> > > the exit itself, not its upstream, that is doing the censorship.
> > > 
> > > Or that if fault can't be determined to the upstream or exit, what
> > > would be the plausible malicious benefit for an exit / upstream
> > > to block a given destination such that a badexit is warranted...
> > > 
> > > a) Frustrate and divert off 0.001% of Turk users smart enough to
> > > use tor, chancing through tor client random exit selection of your
> > > blocking exit, off to one of the workarounds that you're equally
> > > unlikely to control and have ranked, through your exit vs one
> > > of the others tor has open?
> > > 
> > > b) Prop up weird or otherwise secretly bad nodes on the net,
> > > like the hundreds of other ones out there, for which no badexit
> > > or diverse subscription services yet exist to qualify them?
> > > 
> > > c) ???
> > > 
> > > Or that some large number of topsites were censored via
> > > singular or small numbers of exits / upstreams so as to be
> > > exceedingly annoying to the network users as a whole, where
> > > no other environment of such / chaotic widespread annoyance
> > > is known to exist at the same time.
> > > _______________________________________________
> > > tor-relays mailing list
> > > tor-relays@lists.torproject.org
> > > https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-relays
> > > 
> > 
> > 
> > _______________________________________________
> > tor-relays mailing \
> > listtor-relays@lists.torproject.orghttps://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-relays
> >  
> > 
> > --
> > One person's moral compass is another person's face in the dirt.
> > 
> > _______________________________________________
> > tor-relays mailing list
> > tor-relays@lists.torproject.org
> > https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-relays
> > 
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