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List:       tor-talk
Subject:    Re: [tor-talk] The New Threat: Targeted Internet Traffic Misdirection
From:       coderman <coderman () gmail ! com>
Date:       2013-11-21 19:15:11
Message-ID: CAJVRA1TvO09n-xGAiM8BKr2HE4MYs1ZfybBDi-YU99drvtv0-Q () mail ! gmail ! com
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On Thu, Nov 21, 2013 at 9:33 AM, Seth David Schoen <schoen@eff.org> wrote:
> ...
> You could use BGP redirection to become able to spy on traffic
> headed to a guard node or coming out of an exit node that would
> otherwise not have passed through networks that you control.
> The most relevant consequence of that would probably be increasing
> the probability that the attacker can successfully do a traffic
> correlation or confirmation attack.


active attacks, of various types, are also clearly possible.  the
impact of these varied, but possibly significant.

i recommend all relay ops sign up for cyclops alerts for suspicious
BGP behavior on their netblocks:
http://cyclops.cs.ucla.edu/

it's a bit noisy, but useful.


best regards,
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