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List:       qubes-devel
Subject:    Re: [qubes-devel] External encrypting proxy w/ Qubes?
From:       Oleg Artemiev <grey.olli () gmail ! com>
Date:       2017-02-20 18:32:04
Message-ID: CABunX6M=mDX5MccBs47kEM9D15ggQLqOchB2E0Jm4WNBZ8uomQ () mail ! gmail ! com
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On Mon, Feb 6, 2017 at 10:53 PM, Oleg Artemiev <grey.olli@gmail.com> wrote:
[..]
> > > > Is the idea of having an external computer with key/encryption
> > > > operations like a special proxy is interesting from your point of
> > > > view?
> > > > Main question - is it possible anyway to have no need in trust to OS vendor?
> > > i think no, at some point you have to trust someone.
[..]
> when code is complex and is at least once downloaded in binary, not
> built from trusted signed sources there're
> anyway still low chances to get powned.
> Qubes lowers these chances much more then any other OS. Though I've to
> trust vendor and their binary distribution system.
> And I do - it's okay when I've no more to hide then everyone around.

[..]
> If external proxy is realized as a separate computer
[..]
> then scheme with one or more AppVMs that never receives non-encrypted
> data since entered "super-paranoid-mode" could be
[..]
> Thus for data entering such an appVM I can
> have no trusts at all (but still trust to encryption
> algo)
[..]

> > > pdf+video, they are really intresting:
> > > https://blog.invisiblethings.org/papers/2015/state_harmful.pdf
> > > https://media.ccc.de/v/32c3-7352-towards_reasonably_trustworthy_x86_laptops
> Thank you, will look. :)
Haven't read the paper yet, but just watched video w/ Joanna talk w/
idea explanations.
Perfect. :)

> realize a simple text protocol that such a proxy
[..]
> 2. the keyboard driver is detached from AppVM to work in
> proxying-encryption mode and receive input not from user keybpard but from remote
> encrypting proxy
[..]
> 4. any other software works as usual.

[inserting from another message:]

> > This reminds me this talk:
> > https://fahrplan.events.ccc.de/congress/2016/Fahrplan/events/8014.html
> > https://media.ccc.de/v/33c3-8014-untrusting_the_cpu
> > I really recommend watching it.
> Thanks. Enjoyed,Interesting. Makes 2nd PC unneeded and about
> the same thing (almost).
> Though it is a proof of concept and needs a lot of things to be
> implemented - far from realizing this and it looks harder, then
> implement similar thing via usual software with two computers.
But:

> And this is a problem to intercept usual laptop w/ this.
> My idea simpler to realise,
Will work with any two PCs (qubes + qubes or qubes + any other os)

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