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List:       qubes-devel
Subject:    Re: [qubes-devel] Exposed surface of the template used for the sys-* VMs
From:       Andrew David Wong <adw () qubes-os ! org>
Date:       2016-12-28 7:28:08
Message-ID: 80407ed4-3aa6-a7e3-ad71-d19c031ea2af () qubes-os ! org
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On 2016-12-27 11:38, 'David Shleifman' via qubes-devel wrote:
> One of the great things about Qubes OS is the reduction of the surface
> exposed to attacks [1].  The road to achieve this is discussed elsewhere [2].
> 
> Individual virtual machines such as sys-net, sys-firewall, and sys-usb
> indeed limit the exposed surface.   In Qubes 3.2 they are based on the
> Fedora template.   The exposed surface of this template is most likely
> bigger than the exposed surface of the Fedora-minimal template [3].
> What are the driving factors behind the decision to stick to the Fedora
> template as opposed to the Fedora-minimal template?  Has a template
> with a smaller kernel ever been considered?
> 

We haven't decided to stick to the Fedora template as opposed to the
Fedora-minimal template. We offer both. The Fedora-minimal template is
only appropriate for users who are willing and able to install many
programs on their own. It is not suitable as a general use template or
as a default template since it does not contain any of the programs that
the vast majority of users expect to be able to use.

In short, it would be a UX and support nightmare to set the
Fedora-minimal template as the default. Many users would be confused and
frustrated about why even basic things like 'sudo' and 'vi' aren't
available.

On the other hand, more advanced users find the ability to have a blank
slate to work with very appealing for innumerable purposes. The
Fedora-minimal template is meant for these users.

> 
> References
> ----------
> 
> [1] How is Qubes different from other security solutions? \
> https://www.qubes-os.org/doc/user-faq/#how-is-qubes-different-from-other-security-solutions
>  [2] See for instance, Software compartmentalization vs. physical separation. \
> http://invisiblethingslab.com/resources/2014/Software_compartmentalization_vs_physical_separation.pdf
>  [3] Fedora - minimal. https://www.qubes-os.org/doc/templates/fedora-minimal/
> 

- -- 
Andrew David Wong (Axon)
Community Manager, Qubes OS
https://www.qubes-os.org
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