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List:       qemu-ppc
Subject:    Re: [PATCH v7 02/13] confidential guest support: Introduce new confidential guest support class
From:       David Gibson <david () gibson ! dropbear ! id ! au>
Date:       2021-01-29 2:32:09
Message-ID: 20210129023209.GH6951 () yekko ! fritz ! box
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On Thu, Jan 21, 2021 at 09:08:07AM +0000, Dr. David Alan Gilbert wrote:
> * David Gibson (david@gibson.dropbear.id.au) wrote:
> > On Mon, Jan 18, 2021 at 06:51:24PM +0000, Dr. David Alan Gilbert wrote:
> > > * David Gibson (david@gibson.dropbear.id.au) wrote:
> > > > Several architectures have mechanisms which are designed to protect guest
> > > > memory from interference or eavesdropping by a compromised hypervisor.  AMD
> > > > SEV does this with in-chip memory encryption and Intel's MKTME can do
> > >                                                            ^^^^^
> > > (and below) My understanding is that it's Intel TDX that's the VM
> > > equivalent.
> > 
> > I thought MKTME could already do memory encryption and TDX extended
> > that to... more?  I'll adjust the comment to say TDX anyway, since
> > that seems to be the newer name.
> 
> My understanding was MKTME does the memory encryption, but doesn't
> explicitly wire that into VMs or attestation of VMs or anything like
> that.  TDX wires that encryption to VMs and provides all the other glue
> that goes with attestation and the like.

Ok.

-- 
David Gibson			| I'll have my music baroque, and my code
david AT gibson.dropbear.id.au	| minimalist, thank you.  NOT _the_ _other_
				| _way_ _around_!
http://www.ozlabs.org/~dgibson

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