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List:       oss-security
Subject:    Re: [oss-security] 1.2k bug reports for Debian, some may be security
From:       Kurt Seifried <kseifried () redhat ! com>
Date:       2013-06-30 22:37:36
Message-ID: 51D0B330.8010301 () redhat ! com
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On 06/27/2013 09:04 PM, Alexandre Rebert wrote:
> Hi,
> 
> I can confirm most of the bugs have no security implications, and 
> should probably not get CVEs. Given the high number of crashes we 
> found, it is highely likely that some will impact security though.

Please let me know about this laong with impact/etc so I can confirm
they are security related. It's probably easiest to either post the
CVE requests here if the issue is public, if it needs to be private I
suggest using distros@ or emailing me directly. I would also ask that
you notify distros@ of security issues in any event so vendors can
coordinate releases. For more info people see:

people.redhat.com/kseifrie/CVE-OpenSource-Request-HOWTO.html

> Mayhem considered multiple input sources during the analysis of
> the 23K binaries: environment variables, command line arguments,
> files and standard input. Sockets was not one of them. That means
> that we only need to consider two attack vectors: (1) crashes of
> setuid/setgid programs, and (2) crashes with input files that are
> potentially untrusted.
> 
> For (1), I have not checked whether we found crashes in
> setuid/setgid programs yet. It is however straightforward to
> compile a list and forward it to whoever is filing the CVEs. They
> might not be exploitable, but a crash in such programs is
> concerning and might be worth a CVE. Let me know if that's
> something you'd like us to do.
> 
> For (2), it is difficult to automatically identify such crashes.
> As Steve mentioned, it may require a deep familiarity with the
> program. Package maintainers or upstream developers are the most
> suited people to judge whether a crash should be considered
> security critical. It is an unsatisfying solution, as the burden to
> report vulnerabilities would lie on them, but I don't see a way
> around it.

It's the most efficient, I mean Fedora/Debian/etc all have thousands
(Debian is 50k?) packages, that's a lot of software, asking security
researchers to be intimately familiar with it isn't realistic. Plus
most Open Source upstreams want to secure their code and won't mind
(usually).


>> I was under the impression from an incomplete read of the MAYHEM
>> paper that it could generate shellcode for code execution, yet
>> I'm only hearing of reports for crashes.  If code execution can
>> be proven, then that may be informative.
> 
> Yes, that is correct. Mayhem actually generated a couple of
> exploits from the crashes we found. We are currently looking at
> them individually, and we will report all exploits that are
> security issues.
> 
> Regards, The Mayhem Team
> 


- -- 
Kurt Seifried Red Hat Security Response Team (SRT)
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