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List:       oss-security
Subject:    Re: [oss-security] CVE request for ecryptfs
From:       Jamie Strandboge <jamie () canonical ! com>
Date:       2008-10-29 15:28:25
Message-ID: 20081029152825.GF6977 () severus ! strandboge ! com
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On Wed, 29 Oct 2008, Tomas Hoger wrote:

> Hi Jamie!
> 
> On Thu, 23 Oct 2008 16:16:28 -0500 Jamie Strandboge
> <jamie@canonical.com> wrote:
> 
> > While reviewing ecryptfs, I discovered an information disclosure
> > vulnerability in ecryptfs-setup-private and notified upstream. This
> > helper script was known as ecryptfs-setup-confidential in earlier
> > releases.
> > 
> > The problem arises when ecryptfs-setup-private invokes
> > ecryptfs-wrap-passphrase and ecryptfs-add-passphrase with command line
> > arguments that include the user's existing login password as well as
> > the newly created mount password. As a result, these passwords can be
> > snooped in the process table.
> 
> Well the question is whether this should be worded as
> ecryptfs-setup-{private,confidential} issue, or more generic issue
> affecting various ecryptfs-* command line utilities, that only accept
> passwords as command line arguments (i.e. no interactive prompt).  So
> even though there's not ecryptfs-setup-* script to fix in older
> versions, steps done by ecryptfs-setup-* are likely to be performed by
> the user manually, resulting in the same risk of leak as with helper
> script.  Or do I miss anything?
> 

That's exactly right, which reminded me, documentation surrounding
ecryptfs also should be updated. I pinged upstream about it.

I was also notified of an additional commit that is desirable (a bugix
for the patch to ecryptfs-setup-private):
http://git.kernel.org/?p=linux/kernel/git/mhalcrow/ecryptfs-utils.git;a=commit;h=2c422e6d2549f90258cddeebf105b066b598bdbb


Jamie

-- 
Ubuntu Security Engineer     | http://www.ubuntu.com/
Canonical Ltd.               | http://www.canonical.com/


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