[prev in list] [next in list] [prev in thread] [next in thread] 

List:       linux-keyrings
Subject:    [RFC PATCH v1 3/4] ubifs: auth: remove never hit key type error check
From:       Ahmad Fatoum <a.fatoum () pengutronix ! de>
Date:       2021-07-22 9:18:01
Message-ID: a7d493c678d5836577b0dc703e5f0adaa457a7f0.1626945419.git-series.a.fatoum () pengutronix ! de
[Download RAW message or body]

key_request accepts a key type as its first argument. If it returns a
valid pointer, it should always have this same requested key type.

Indeed other request_key users surveyed such as dm-crypt, ecryptfs
and fscrypt v1 also don't check the key type. Therefore drop the
apparently unneeded check.

Signed-off-by: Ahmad Fatoum <a.fatoum@pengutronix.de>
---
To: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
To: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org>
To: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
To: "Serge E. Hallyn" <serge@hallyn.com>
To: Alasdair Kergon <agk@redhat.com>
To: Mike Snitzer <snitzer@redhat.com>
To: dm-devel@redhat.com
To: Song Liu <song@kernel.org>
To: Richard Weinberger <richard@nod.at>
Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Cc: linux-raid@vger.kernel.org
Cc: keyrings@vger.kernel.org
Cc: linux-mtd@lists.infradead.org
Cc: linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org
Cc: linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org
---
 fs/ubifs/auth.c | 6 ------
 1 file changed, 6 deletions(-)

diff --git a/fs/ubifs/auth.c b/fs/ubifs/auth.c
index e564d5ff8781..6a0b8d858d81 100644
--- a/fs/ubifs/auth.c
+++ b/fs/ubifs/auth.c
@@ -286,12 +286,6 @@ int ubifs_init_authentication(struct ubifs_info *c)
 
 	down_read(&keyring_key->sem);
 
-	if (keyring_key->type != &key_type_logon) {
-		ubifs_err(c, "key type must be logon");
-		err = -ENOKEY;
-		goto out;
-	}
-
 	ukp = user_key_payload_locked(keyring_key);
 	if (!ukp) {
 		/* key was revoked before we acquired its semaphore */
-- 
git-series 0.9.1
[prev in list] [next in list] [prev in thread] [next in thread] 

Configure | About | News | Add a list | Sponsored by KoreLogic