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List:       linux-arm-kernel
Subject:    Re: [PATCH v4 07/12] arm64: add sysfs vulnerability show for meltdown
From:       Jeremy Linton <jeremy.linton () arm ! com>
Date:       2019-01-31 21:53:16
Message-ID: 394041d0-a738-84f0-56a7-6803d4180113 () arm ! com
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Hi,

On 01/31/2019 11:54 AM, Andre Przywara wrote:
> On Fri, 25 Jan 2019 12:07:06 -0600
> Jeremy Linton <jeremy.linton@arm.com> wrote:
> 
> Hi,
> 
>> Display the mitigation status if active, otherwise
>> assume the cpu is safe unless it doesn't have CSV3
>> and isn't in our whitelist.
>>
>> Signed-off-by: Jeremy Linton <jeremy.linton@arm.com>
>> ---
>>   arch/arm64/kernel/cpufeature.c | 33 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++------
>>   1 file changed, 27 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)
>>
>> diff --git a/arch/arm64/kernel/cpufeature.c
>> b/arch/arm64/kernel/cpufeature.c
>> index a9e18b9cdc1e..624dfe0b5cdd 100644
>> --- a/arch/arm64/kernel/cpufeature.c
>> +++ b/arch/arm64/kernel/cpufeature.c
>> @@ -944,6 +944,8 @@ has_useable_cnp(const struct arm64_cpu_capabilities *entry, int scope)
>> 	return has_cpuid_feature(entry, scope);
>> }
>>   
>> +/* default value is invalid until unmap_kernel_at_el0() runs */
> 
> Shall we somehow enforce this? For instance by making __meltdown_safe
> an enum, initialised to UNKNOWN?

Hehe, well I think people complained about my "UNKNOWN" enum. But, in 
the end this version is trying to make it clear we shouldn't have any 
unknown states remaining.

> Then bail out with a BUG_ON or WARN_ON in the sysfs code?

AFAIK, it shouldn't be possible to actually run the sysfs code before 
this gets initialized. So, the comment is just making it clear/forcing 
the understanding of that.


> 
> I just want to avoid to accidentally report "safe" when we actually
> aren't.
> 
>> +static bool __meltdown_safe = true;
>>   static int __kpti_forced; /* 0: not forced, >0: forced on, <0: forced off */
>>   static bool unmap_kernel_at_el0(const struct arm64_cpu_capabilities *entry,
>> @@ -962,6 +964,16 @@ static bool unmap_kernel_at_el0(const struct arm64_cpu_capabilities *entry,
>> 		{ /* sentinel */ }
>>   	};
>>   	char const *str = "command line option";
>> +	bool meltdown_safe;
>> +
>> +	meltdown_safe = is_midr_in_range_list(read_cpuid_id(), kpti_safe_list);
>> +
>> +	/* Defer to CPU feature registers */
>> +	if (has_cpuid_feature(entry, scope))
>> +		meltdown_safe = true;
>> +
>> +	if (!meltdown_safe)
>> +		__meltdown_safe = false;
>>   
>>   	/*
>>   	 * For reasons that aren't entirely clear, enabling KPTI on Cavium
>> @@ -984,12 +996,7 @@ static bool unmap_kernel_at_el0(const struct arm64_cpu_capabilities *entry,
>> 	if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_RANDOMIZE_BASE))
>> 		return kaslr_offset() > 0;
>>   
>> -	/* Don't force KPTI for CPUs that are not vulnerable */
>> -	if (is_midr_in_range_list(read_cpuid_id(), kpti_safe_list))
>> -		return false;
>> -
>> -	/* Defer to CPU feature registers */
>> -	return !has_cpuid_feature(entry, scope);
>> +	return !meltdown_safe;
>>   }
>>   
>>   static void
>> @@ -2055,3 +2062,17 @@ static int __init enable_mrs_emulation(void)
>>   }
>>   
>>   core_initcall(enable_mrs_emulation);
>> +
>> +#ifdef CONFIG_GENERIC_CPU_VULNERABILITIES
>> +ssize_t cpu_show_meltdown(struct device *dev, struct device_attribute *attr,
>> +		char *buf)
> 
> w/s issue.
> 
> Cheers,
> Andre.
> 
>> +{
>> +	if (arm64_kernel_unmapped_at_el0())
>> +		return sprintf(buf, "Mitigation: KPTI\n");
>> +
>> +	if (__meltdown_safe)
>> +		return sprintf(buf, "Not affected\n");
>> +
>> +	return sprintf(buf, "Vulnerable\n");
>> +}
>> +#endif
> 


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