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List:       linux-api
Subject:    Re: [PATCH v22 04/12] landlock: Add ptrace restrictions
From:       Jann Horn <jannh () google ! com>
Date:       2020-10-29 1:06:06
Message-ID: CAG48ez1W2sHBeL4pV4QqUonUJc-snNnxE_jh8FVP=pyhhm0fdg () mail ! gmail ! com
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On Tue, Oct 27, 2020 at 9:04 PM Micka=C3=ABl Sala=C3=BCn <mic@digikod.net> =
wrote:
> Using ptrace(2) and related debug features on a target process can lead
> to a privilege escalation.  Indeed, ptrace(2) can be used by an attacker
> to impersonate another task and to remain undetected while performing
> malicious activities.  Thanks to  ptrace_may_access(), various part of
> the kernel can check if a tracer is more privileged than a tracee.
>
> A landlocked process has fewer privileges than a non-landlocked process
> and must then be subject to additional restrictions when manipulating
> processes. To be allowed to use ptrace(2) and related syscalls on a
> target process, a landlocked process must have a subset of the target
> process's rules (i.e. the tracee must be in a sub-domain of the tracer).
>
> Cc: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
> Cc: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>
> Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
> Cc: Serge E. Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com>
> Signed-off-by: Micka=C3=ABl Sala=C3=BCn <mic@linux.microsoft.com>

Reviewed-by: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>
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