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List: kvm
Subject: Re: [PATCH v7 22/26] KVM: VMX: Set up interception for CET MSRs
From: Maxim Levitsky <mlevitsk () redhat ! com>
Date: 2023-11-30 17:44:45
Message-ID: 393d82243b7f44731439717be82b20fbeda45c77.camel () redhat ! com
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On Fri, 2023-11-24 at 00:53 -0500, Yang Weijiang wrote:
> Enable/disable CET MSRs interception per associated feature configuration.
> Shadow Stack feature requires all CET MSRs passed through to guest to make
> it supported in user and supervisor mode while IBT feature only depends on
> MSR_IA32_{U,S}_CETS_CET to enable user and supervisor IBT.
>
> Note, this MSR design introduced an architectural limitation of SHSTK and
> IBT control for guest, i.e., when SHSTK is exposed, IBT is also available
> to guest from architectual perspective since IBT relies on subset of SHSTK
> relevant MSRs.
>
> Signed-off-by: Yang Weijiang <weijiang.yang@intel.com>
> ---
> arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c | 42 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
> 1 file changed, 42 insertions(+)
>
> diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c
> index 554f665e59c3..e484333eddb0 100644
> --- a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c
> +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c
> @@ -699,6 +699,10 @@ static bool is_valid_passthrough_msr(u32 msr)
> case MSR_LBR_CORE_TO ... MSR_LBR_CORE_TO + 8:
> /* LBR MSRs. These are handled in vmx_update_intercept_for_lbr_msrs() */
> return true;
> + case MSR_IA32_U_CET:
> + case MSR_IA32_S_CET:
> + case MSR_IA32_PL0_SSP ... MSR_IA32_INT_SSP_TAB:
> + return true;
> }
>
> r = possible_passthrough_msr_slot(msr) != -ENOENT;
> @@ -7766,6 +7770,42 @@ static void update_intel_pt_cfg(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
> vmx->pt_desc.ctl_bitmask &= ~(0xfULL << (32 + i * 4));
> }
>
> +static void vmx_update_intercept_for_cet_msr(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
> +{
> + bool incpt;
> +
> + if (kvm_cpu_cap_has(X86_FEATURE_SHSTK)) {
> + incpt = !guest_cpuid_has(vcpu, X86_FEATURE_SHSTK);
> +
> + vmx_set_intercept_for_msr(vcpu, MSR_IA32_U_CET,
> + MSR_TYPE_RW, incpt);
> + vmx_set_intercept_for_msr(vcpu, MSR_IA32_S_CET,
> + MSR_TYPE_RW, incpt);
> + vmx_set_intercept_for_msr(vcpu, MSR_IA32_PL0_SSP,
> + MSR_TYPE_RW, incpt);
> + vmx_set_intercept_for_msr(vcpu, MSR_IA32_PL1_SSP,
> + MSR_TYPE_RW, incpt);
> + vmx_set_intercept_for_msr(vcpu, MSR_IA32_PL2_SSP,
> + MSR_TYPE_RW, incpt);
> + vmx_set_intercept_for_msr(vcpu, MSR_IA32_PL3_SSP,
> + MSR_TYPE_RW, incpt);
> + if (guest_cpuid_has(vcpu, X86_FEATURE_LM))
> + vmx_set_intercept_for_msr(vcpu, MSR_IA32_INT_SSP_TAB,
> + MSR_TYPE_RW, incpt);
> + if (!incpt)
> + return;
> + }
> +
> + if (kvm_cpu_cap_has(X86_FEATURE_IBT)) {
> + incpt = !guest_cpuid_has(vcpu, X86_FEATURE_IBT);
> +
> + vmx_set_intercept_for_msr(vcpu, MSR_IA32_U_CET,
> + MSR_TYPE_RW, incpt);
> + vmx_set_intercept_for_msr(vcpu, MSR_IA32_S_CET,
> + MSR_TYPE_RW, incpt);
> + }
> +}
> +
> static void vmx_vcpu_after_set_cpuid(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
> {
> struct vcpu_vmx *vmx = to_vmx(vcpu);
> @@ -7843,6 +7883,8 @@ static void vmx_vcpu_after_set_cpuid(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
>
> /* Refresh #PF interception to account for MAXPHYADDR changes. */
> vmx_update_exception_bitmap(vcpu);
> +
> + vmx_update_intercept_for_cet_msr(vcpu);
> }
>
> static u64 vmx_get_perf_capabilities(void)
My review feedback from the previous patch still applies as well,
I still think that we should either try a best effort approach to plug
this virtualization hole, or we at least should fail guest creation
if the virtualization hole is present as I said:
"Another, much simpler option is to fail the guest creation if the shadow stack + \
indirect branch tracking state differs between host and the guest, unless both are \
disabled in the guest. (in essence don't let the guest be created if (2) or (3) \
happen)"
Please at least tell me what do you think about this.
Best regards,
Maxim Levitsky
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