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List:       kernel-hardening
Subject:    Re: [PATCH v6 00/27] x86: PIE support and option to extend KASLR randomization
From:       Thomas Garnier <thgarnie () chromium ! org>
Date:       2019-01-31 22:42:21
Message-ID: CAJcbSZE890YgtEv_Z9A3kPukQzmZmgo0xM=pruMB3uTziBFwMw () mail ! gmail ! com
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On Thu, Jan 31, 2019 at 1:41 PM Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk
<konrad.wilk@oracle.com> wrote:
>
> On Thu, Jan 31, 2019 at 11:24:07AM -0800, Thomas Garnier wrote:
> > There has been no major concern in the latest iterations. I am interested on
> > what would be the best way to slowly integrate this patchset upstream.
>
> One question that I was somehow expected in this cover letter - what
> about all those lovely speculative bugs? As in say some one hasn't
> updated their machine with the Spectre v3a microcode - wouldn't they
> be able to get the kernel virtual address space?

Yes they would be.

>
> In effect rendering all this hard-work not needed?

Only if we think Spectre bugs will never be fixed.
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