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List:       kde-usability
Subject:    Re: Security and usability
From:       David Hugh-Jones <hughjonesd () yahoo ! co ! uk>
Date:       2003-08-18 10:54:49
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I agree very much with your general point about usability and security,
and I also do web programming and use cookies, but they _can_ be
dangerous: here's one result of a quick google. Nobody got harmed but
clearly there was the potential for serious harm.

http://archives.neohapsis.com/archives/vulnwatch/2002-q1/0079.html

dave

On Mon, 2003-08-18 at 11:41, Roland Seuhs wrote:
> Hi!
> 
> I've followed the discussion about KDE3 defaults, especially the part about cookies and how evil they \
> are supposed to be. To get it straight, I'm a web programmer and I use cookies all the time and I'm \
> more and more angry at the cookie-hysteria. 
> Has there been a single recorded event in which a cookie has caused actual harm to some user? I don't \
> think so. 
> The problem is that the paradigm that "security and usability is a tradeoff" is repeated so often that \
> it's seen as some universal law while in reality it's basically nonsense. 
> Let me explain:
> 
> In my opinion, security can only be achieved WITH usability. Any measures to make something more secure \
> by reducing usability will essentially have the opposite effect. 
> So what will happen if cookies in Konq will be disabled or made single-session by default as some \
> people suggested? Konqueror will become essentially useless for many sites - some users will be pissed \
> and turn on cookies, the rest will be pissed and use another browser: Security gain = zero. 
> The current situation in which the user is bothered with a popup when submitting a form or getting a \
> cookie isn't much better. There are 2 possibilities:
> 
> - Either a user understands the popup:
> 	He'l say "what idiotic message, if I submit a form I know that data is transmitted, no need to tell \
> me" and ignore it 
> - Or a user doesn't understand the popup:
> 	He'll ask somebody who will tell him to "press yes and ignore it", then just press yes and ignore this \
> and any subsequent popups. 
> Essentially, all the useless popups (not only in KDE, but in many other DEs and programs) are training \
> the users to press yes and ignore popups. 
> Anybody who thinks that these popups are increasing security is just wrong: First he is wrong because \
> those popups are ignored, secondly he is wrong because cookies and forms are no security problems. I \
> repeat it: If you say "But it's just about educating the users that the connection is not encrypted" - \
> You are wrong: Users will ignore the popup, many won't even read it. It simply doesn't matter. If \
> pressing "OK" is the only way to use the website, users will press "OK", no matter what you write into \
> that annoying popup. 
> The reverse is true: Because people are trained to ignore popups, the inportant ones get unnoticed and \
> will also be ignored. 
> Another example is the file-upload popup which can't even be turned off.
> 
> Now the user goes to a website and uploads a file, he intentionally browses for a file to transfer and \
> chooses the file himself. The chances that he doesn't know what he is doing and will transfer \
> /etc/passwd by accident are pretty slim. And the hopes for a potential attacker to set up a website for \
> accidentally uploaded password files are even slimmer. The whole dialog is useless and nonsense. It is \
> just repeating what the user already did (trying to upload a file) and yet another useless "are you \
> sure" dialog. 
> Security can only be achieved *with* usability. Which means *less* popups and *less* hassles.
> 
> A perfect example would be scp ("fish" in Konqueror)
> 
> The user/password dialog should contain a checkbox that reads "always allow this computer access to \
> user@machine (store public key on remote machine)" which would automatically append the public key to \
> ~/.ssh/authorized_keys2 on the remote machine. 
> Guess what would happen?
> 
> - People would stop using ftp and use scp instead. Encrypted passwords -> more security
> - People would stop putting user:password@machine ftp/fish links into bookmarks -> more security
> 
> Or even better, when Konqueror is used in ftp-mode with a username and password, Konqueror could check \
> if a ssh/scp server is also listening and if yes (and only if yes) ask the user wether to try scp \
> instead of ftp. (This is an occasion in which a popup would actually make sense: It's rare enough that \
> it doesn't cause a flood and it actually offers REAL security gains) But don't do it on anonymous \
> ftp-connections (There are no passwords at risk and the user is unlikely to have a ssh account anyway) \
> and only ask once for a host. 
> However all this works only if it's usable and automatic. 
> 
> Sniffing passwords from ftp and php3 accounts are *REAL* security issues that cause *REAL* problems, \
> unlike the hype around cookies and html-forms which are basically just hysteria with not a single \
> documented case of harm caused. 
> Dumping the cookie, html-form and file-upload popups and introducing rarely shown "use scp instead of \
> ftp" popups would increase security *BECAUSE* it would reduce hassles and popups and concentrate the \
> user's attention on the things that actually matter. 
> Roland
> 
> -- 
> Hardware: The parts of a computer system that can be kicked
> 
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