From kde-devel  Thu May 27 13:30:19 2010
From: Joanna Rutkowska <joanna () invisiblethingslab ! com>
Date: Thu, 27 May 2010 13:30:19 +0000
To: kde-devel
Subject: SFTP server for tarballs?
Message-Id: <4BFE73EB.9070709 () invisiblethingslab ! com>
X-MARC-Message: https://marc.info/?l=kde-devel&m=127496688415006
MIME-Version: 1
Content-Type: multipart/mixed; boundary="--===============1773399071=="

This is an OpenPGP/MIME signed message (RFC 2440 and 3156)
--===============1773399071==
Content-Type: multipart/signed; micalg=pgp-sha1;
 protocol="application/pgp-signature";
 boundary="------------enigC361E6BB50AB2EF52909D8E3"

This is an OpenPGP/MIME signed message (RFC 2440 and 3156)
--------------enigC361E6BB50AB2EF52909D8E3
Content-Type: text/plain; charset=ISO-8859-1
Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable

On 05/26/2010 12:10 PM, Scott Kitterman wrote:
>=20
>=20
> "Joanna Rutkowska" <joanna@invisiblethingslab.com> wrote:
>=20
>> On 05/26/2010 03:49 AM, Scott Kitterman wrote:
>>>> Instead of having just one private key, it would be much better for
>>>> every commiter/release-manager or whoever is responsible for buildin=
g
>>>> the stable tarballs, to generate their own private key and use it fo=
r
>>>> signing. Then, there should be one "master signing key" that would b=
e
>>>> kept on some safe machine (perhaps used just for the purpose of
>>>> generating and using this key) and which would be used to sign all t=
he
>>>> "authorized" developers keys. This key (the public portion) would be=

>>>> published on kde.org website, and you can also send it to kde-devel
>>>> list, to make it possible for people to obtain it from 2 different
>>>> sources (I guess kde-devel is widely mirrored over internet, so it w=
ould
>>>> not be feasible for the attacker to subvert this public key in all t=
he
>>>> places). Perhaps only the top 2 or 3 most trusted KDE developers (I'=
m
>>>> sorry I don't know the management structure of the project) should h=
ave
>>>> access to the master signing key.
>>>>
>>> Speaking as an Ubuntu packager, we maintain in transit assurance of
>>> package integrity by retrieving the tarballs via sftp.  If someone
>>> can MITM my SSH session,  then there's a lot better things they can
>>> do with it than modify KDE tarballs in transit.
>>>
>>
>> That's certainly better than relaying on the SHA1 hash embedded on the=

>> plaintext HTML page. But still doesn't help if somebody compromised th=
e
>> KDE's ftp server. You might comfort yourself that this is unlikely to
>> happen, but the reality is simply different ...
>=20
> Which is why I specified in transit assurance. I agree signing would
> be better,  but thought it reasonable to point out that at least part
> of the problem had a reasonable solution in place already.
>=20
Can you provide the server name you use and its fingerprint for
verification?

Thanks,
joanna.


--------------enigC361E6BB50AB2EF52909D8E3
Content-Type: application/pgp-signature; name="signature.asc"
Content-Description: OpenPGP digital signature
Content-Disposition: attachment; filename="signature.asc"

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----
Comment: Using GnuPG with Fedora - http://enigmail.mozdev.org/

iEYEARECAAYFAkv+c/kACgkQORdkotfEW85FyQCg83x2WKaF3VOStscDfEhA0EwM
Aj4AoIb/ExWGvciflwKQdEQcI3bMFfiN
=fh7x
-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

--------------enigC361E6BB50AB2EF52909D8E3--

--===============1773399071==
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii"
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit
Content-Disposition: inline

 
>> Visit http://mail.kde.org/mailman/listinfo/kde-devel#unsub to unsubscribe <<

--===============1773399071==--