From kde-core-devel  Mon Feb 23 22:23:35 2009
From: Thiago Macieira <thiago () kde ! org>
Date: Mon, 23 Feb 2009 22:23:35 +0000
To: kde-core-devel
Subject: Re: kdesudo
Message-Id: <200902232323.35969.thiago () kde ! org>
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Alex Merry wrote:
>On Monday 23 February 2009 05:34:26 John Tapsell wrote:
>> A point brought up during the whole .desktop security problem, is
>> kdesudo.  It only prompts for the password once, and then from then on
>> (for next X minutes), doesn't ask for the password again.
>>
>> So a program that wants to become root only has to wait until kdesudo
>> has been run normally, and then can run kdesudo itself, elevating
>> itself to root without the user knowing.
>
>This is a general problem with sudo.  Even if we worked around it in
> kdesudo, an application could still call sudo directly after such an
> event, unless the sudoers file sets the timeout to 0, as Pau mentioned.

In other words, the moment that the trojan is executing, you're already=20
compromised.

We have to protect against the point of entry. And the user shouldn't use=20
superuser more than strictly necessary.

=2D-=20
  Thiago Macieira  -  thiago (AT) macieira.info - thiago (AT) kde.org
    PGP/GPG: 0x6EF45358; fingerprint:
    E067 918B B660 DBD1 105C  966C 33F5 F005 6EF4 5358

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