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List:       ipsec
Subject:    [Ipsec] PFS in CHILD SA creation
From:       Takashi Sorimachi <yoda20052005 () yahoo ! co ! uk>
Date:       2005-07-22 13:53:59
Message-ID: 20050722135359.69725.qmail () web25709 ! mail ! ukl ! yahoo ! com
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Hi,

It was suggested in IKEv2
(draft-ietf-ipsec-ikev2-17.txt) that if a CHILD SA is
created as part of the initial exchange, the nonces
from the initial exchange should be used to compute
keys for the CHILD SA (p.9).

The key set for CHILD SA:
KEYMAT = prf(SK_d, Ni | Nr)

SK_d is derived from SKEYSEED (the root secret),
whereas Ni and Nr are the nonces which have been used
already in the initial exchange.

Doesn't this arrangement lead to an imperfect forward
secrecy, given that all the elements of KEYMAT were
derived/used in the initial key exchange?

Thanks.


	
	
		
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