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List:       ipfire-scm
Subject:    [git.ipfire.org] IPFire 2.x development tree tag, v2.25-core155, created. c1472bdfdbd2f22de7a1ebe4d7
From:       Michael Tremer <git () ipfire ! org>
Date:       2021-03-26 12:17:35
Message-ID: 4F6LZl64Vdz2xL9 () people01 ! haj ! ipfire ! org
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The tag, v2.25-core155 has been created
        at  c1472bdfdbd2f22de7a1ebe4d79d1ec065bd5679 (commit)

- Log -----------------------------------------------------------------
commit c1472bdfdbd2f22de7a1ebe4d79d1ec065bd5679
Author: Michael Tremer <michael.tremer@ipfire.org>
Date:   Thu Mar 25 14:36:34 2021 +0000

    openssl: Update to 1.1.1k
    
    From https://www.openssl.org/news/secadv/20210325.txt:
    
    OpenSSL Security Advisory [25 March 2021]
    =========================================
    
    CA certificate check bypass with X509_V_FLAG_X509_STRICT (CVE-2021-3450)
    ========================================================================
    
    Severity: High
    
    The X509_V_FLAG_X509_STRICT flag enables additional security checks of the
    certificates present in a certificate chain. It is not set by default.
    
    Starting from OpenSSL version 1.1.1h a check to disallow certificates in
    the chain that have explicitly encoded elliptic curve parameters was added
    as an additional strict check.
    
    An error in the implementation of this check meant that the result of a
    previous check to confirm that certificates in the chain are valid CA
    certificates was overwritten. This effectively bypasses the check
    that non-CA certificates must not be able to issue other certificates.
    
    If a "purpose" has been configured then there is a subsequent opportunity
    for checks that the certificate is a valid CA.  All of the named "purpose"
    values implemented in libcrypto perform this check.  Therefore, where
    a purpose is set the certificate chain will still be rejected even when the
    strict flag has been used. A purpose is set by default in libssl client and
    server certificate verification routines, but it can be overridden or
    removed by an application.
    
    In order to be affected, an application must explicitly set the
    X509_V_FLAG_X509_STRICT verification flag and either not set a purpose
    for the certificate verification or, in the case of TLS client or server
    applications, override the default purpose.
    
    OpenSSL versions 1.1.1h and newer are affected by this issue. Users of these
    versions should upgrade to OpenSSL 1.1.1k.
    
    OpenSSL 1.0.2 is not impacted by this issue.
    
    This issue was reported to OpenSSL on 18th March 2021 by Benjamin Kaduk
    from Akamai and was discovered by Xiang Ding and others at Akamai. The fix was
    developed by Tomáš Mráz.
    
    NULL pointer deref in signature_algorithms processing (CVE-2021-3449)
    =====================================================================
    
    Severity: High
    
    An OpenSSL TLS server may crash if sent a maliciously crafted renegotiation
    ClientHello message from a client. If a TLSv1.2 renegotiation ClientHello omits
    the signature_algorithms extension (where it was present in the initial
    ClientHello), but includes a signature_algorithms_cert extension then a NULL
    pointer dereference will result, leading to a crash and a denial of service
    attack.
    
    A server is only vulnerable if it has TLSv1.2 and renegotiation enabled (which
    is the default configuration). OpenSSL TLS clients are not impacted by this
    issue.
    
    All OpenSSL 1.1.1 versions are affected by this issue. Users of these versions
    should upgrade to OpenSSL 1.1.1k.
    
    OpenSSL 1.0.2 is not impacted by this issue.
    
    This issue was reported to OpenSSL on 17th March 2021 by Nokia. The fix was
    developed by Peter Kästle and Samuel Sapalski from Nokia.
    
    Signed-off-by: Michael Tremer <michael.tremer@ipfire.org>
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