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List:       ietf-tls
Subject:    Re: [TLS] TLSv1.2 with DSA client cert and key size >1024 bits
From:       Martin Rex <mrex () sap ! com>
Date:       2011-03-23 0:58:56
Message-ID: 201103230058.p2N0wuwJ022566 () fs4113 ! wdf ! sap ! corp
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Dr Stephen Henson wrote:
> 
> Using SHA-2 algorithms isn't possible in TLS 1.1 and earlier with RSA as they
> hard code the SHA1+MD5 signature.

"not possible in TLS 1.1 and earlier" is an inappropriate determination.

The two possibilities to do this in TLSv1.0 and TLSv1.1 are

  - a specification of an RSA-based TLS cipher suite, intuitively one
    that already uses SHA-256 for the data MAC, to produce the
    "digitally signed struct" with SHA-256 instead of MD5+SHA1

  - a specification of a TLS extension for the purpose of using
    SHA-256 instead of MD5+SHA1 for the "digitally signed struct"
    probably along with a replacement of the "default TLS PRF"
    which is based on an P_MD5() XOR P_SHA1() in TLSv1.0&v1.1
    with a PRF based on P_SHA256() such as in TLSv1.2

-Martin

PS: in case anyone is wondering "why not implement TLSv1.2"?

    - the definition of the signature algorithms extension in rfc-5246
      is pretty much fouled up that I wouldn't count to obtain a sensible
      level of interoperability with it.

    - the clients uncertainty about the hash that will be allowed/required
      for the "digitally signed struct" of the ClientVerify handshake
      message hash

    - the protocol version intolerance for TLSv1.2 in the installed
      base seems worse than the TLS extension intolerance, i.e.
      A TLS record with protocol_version { 0x03, 0x00 } carrying
      a ClientHello with client_version { 0x03, 0x03 } is not advisable
      for clients that do not have application-level dirty hacks to close
      the connection after a failed TLS handshake and restart a new
      connection with a less "sophisiticated" ClientHello.


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