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List:       ietf-tls
Subject:    Re: [TLS] Review of draft-kato-tls-rfc4132bis-00
From:       KATO Akihiro <akato () po ! ntts ! co ! jp>
Date:       2008-03-06 7:40:41
Message-ID: 47CF9FF9.30406 () po ! ntts ! co ! jp
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Eric,

Thank you for reviewing and comments.

On 2008/03/05 2:53, Eric Rescorla wrote:
> $Id: draft-kato-tls-rfc4132bis-00-rev.txt,v 1.1 2008/03/04 17:32:45 ekr Exp $
> 
> It's not clear to me why this document isn't simply an updated
> cut-and-paste of RFC 4132 with additional ciphers. In particular,
> this draft contains a large number of grammatical errors which
> have already been ironed out of 4132.
Sure, quality of this version of our draft is low. I-D repository
version will get through more internal review.

> It's not clear to me that we really need the combinatoric
> explosion of all possible key exchange and signature
> algorithms with Camellia.
Cipher suites combined CTR mode will remove. But one-side of Cipher
suite combined SHA-384 or SHA-512 will remain.

> 
> I think it's a bad idea to specify HMAC-SHA-1 for use with
> the SHA-1 cipher suites. Note that all the suites in
> TLS 1.2 use SHA-256
I found this description for PRF. I'm going to change MAC section as
following;

          Indicator of
          Cipher Suite         MAC             PRF

          SHA                  HMAC-SHA-1      P_SHA-256
          SHA256               HMAC-SHA-256    P_SHA-256
          SHA384               HMAC-SHA-384    P_SHA-256
          SHA512               HMAC-SHA-512    P_SHA-256

> 
> Why do we need a mandatory to implement Camellia cipher
> suite? TLS is quite capable of negotiating this stuff.
"Mandatory Cipher Suite" section will remove.

> 
> 
> -Ekr
> _______________________________________________
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> TLS@ietf.org
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls
> 
> 


-- 
- KATO Akihiro
  + NTT Software Corporation

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