'[FD] Open-Xchange Security Advisory 2020-06-12'

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List:       full-disclosure
Subject:    [FD] Open-Xchange Security Advisory 2020-06-12
From:       Open-Xchange GmbH via Fulldisclosure <fulldisclosure () seclists ! org>
Date:       2020-06-12 8:07:37
Message-ID: EC6A1838-600B-428E-8CE2-2D8808282179 () open-xchange ! com
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Dear subscribers,

we're sharing our latest advisory with you and like to thank everyone who contributed in \
finding and solving those vulnerabilities. Feel free to join our bug bounty programs for OX \
AppSuite, Dovecot and PowerDNS at HackerOne.

Yours sincerely,
Martin Heiland, Open-Xchange GmbH

Product: OX App Suite / OX Documents
Vendor: OX Software GmbH

Internal reference: 68441, 68453, 68454 (Bug ID)
Vulnerability type: Server-Side Request Forgery (CWE-918)
Vulnerable version: 7.10.3 and earlier
Vulnerable component: backend, office documentconverter
Report confidence: Confirmed
Solution status: Fixed by Vendor
Fixed version: 7.8.4-rev68, 7.10.1-rev28, 7.10.2-rev22, 7.10.3-rev7
Vendor notification: 2019-11-29
Solution date: 2020-03-06
Public disclosure: 2020-06-12
CVE reference: CVE-2019-18846, CVE-2020-8544
CVSS: 5.0 (CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:L/I:N/A:N)

Vulnerability Details:
Our blacklisting restrictions for various APIs have flaws that allow attackers to bypass \
certain checks by using "smart" endpoints. In detail, the check if a URL is blacklisted was \
triggered independently from accessing the actual resource. Malicious endpoints with knowledge \
about application state could abuse this to bypass blacklisted resources. The same \
vulnerability affects multiple components.

Risk:
Users can trigger API calls that invoke local URLs, if a host can be accessed a different error \
will be returned compared to unavailable hosts. This can be used to discover an internal \
network topology and services.

Steps to reproduce:
1. Create a RSS feed
2. Specify a resource where the endpoint responds differently based on the request count
3. Return a valid result on the blacklist request but HTTP redirect when actually accessing the \
resource

Solution:
We improved the blacklisting check to make sure the actual resource is being checked when \
retrieving.

---

Internal reference: 68478 (Bug ID)
Vulnerability type: Cross-Site Scripting (CWE-80)
Vulnerable version: 7.10.3 and earlier
Vulnerable component: frontend
Report confidence: Confirmed
Solution status: Fixed by Vendor
Fixed version: 7.8.4-rev62, 7.10.1-rev28, 7.10.2-rev20, 7.10.3-rev6
Vendor notification: 2019-12-02
Solution date: 2020-03-06
Public disclosure: 2020-06-12
CVE reference: CVE-2020-8542
CVSS: 2.2 CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:H/PR:L/UI:R/S:U/C:L/I:N/A:N

Vulnerability Details:
Self-XSS was possible when pasting malicious HTML content to the mail signature editor. This \
could be used as part of a social engineering scheme.

Risk:
Users can trigger API calls that invoke local URLs, if a host can be accessed a different error \
will be returned compared to unavailable hosts. This can be used to discover an internal \
network topology and services.

Steps to reproduce:
1. Ask a user to edit a mail signature and use the "Code" feature
2. Make the user paste malicious HTML Code, for example SVG with embedded JS
3. Example: <EMBED SRC="...

Solution:
We improved frontend sanitization of user-provided content.

---

Internal reference: 68681 (Bug ID)
Vulnerability type: Cross-Site Scripting (CWE-80)
Vulnerable version: 7.10.3 and earlier
Vulnerable component: office-web / frontend
Report confidence: Confirmed
Solution status: Fixed by Vendor
Fixed version: 7.8.4-rev62, 7.10.1-rev28, 7.10.2-rev20, 7.10.3-rev6
Vendor notification: 2020-01-09
Solution date: 2020-03-06
Public disclosure: 2020-06-12
Researcher Credits: chbi
CVE reference: CVE-2020-8542
CVSS: 2.2 CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:H/PR:L/UI:R/S:U/C:L/I:N/A:N

Vulnerability Details:
Self-XSS was possible when pasting malicious HTML content to OX Documents, for example when \
composing a text document. This could be used as part of a social engineering scheme.

Risk:
Users can trigger API calls that invoke local URLs, if a host can be accessed a different error \
will be returned compared to unavailable hosts. This can be used to discover an internal \
network topology and services.

Steps to reproduce:
1. Ask a user to edit a document
2. Make the user paste malicious HTML/JS code
3. Example:  tempor sit amet nulla non, <svg></p><style><a id="</style><img src=1 \
onerror=alert(ox.session)>"> sodales molestie velit

Solution:
We improved frontend sanitization of user-provided content.

---

Internal reference: OXUIB-39 (Bug ID)
Vulnerability type: Cross-Site Scripting (CWE-80)
Vulnerable version: 7.10.3 and earlier
Vulnerable component: frontend
Report confidence: Confirmed
Solution status: Fixed by Vendor
Fixed version: 7.10.1-rev28, 7.10.2-rev20, 7.10.3-rev6
Vendor notification: 2020-01-27
Solution date: 2020-03-06
Public disclosure: 2020-06-12
Researcher Credits: zee_shan
CVE reference: CVE-2020-8542
CVSS: 5.3 CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:N/A:N

Vulnerability Details:
Script code within a HTML E-Mail was executed under certain circumstances, like agreeing to \
load external images.

Risk:
Users can trigger API calls that invoke local URLs, if a host can be accessed a different error \
will be returned compared to unavailable hosts. This can be used to discover an internal \
network topology and services.

Steps to reproduce:
1. Create a malicious mail with external images
2. Make the user load external content within the mail
3. Example: <a class=xss style='font:"xss{color:color><img src onerror=alert(doc...

Solution:
The sanitizer has been improved to consider "getUnmodified" function calls.

---

Internal reference: MWB-34 (Bug ID)
Vulnerability type: Improper Parameter Validation (CWE-20)
Vulnerable version: 7.10.3 and earlier
Vulnerable component: backend
Report confidence: Confirmed
Solution status: Fixed by Vendor
Fixed version: 7.8.4-rev68, 7.10.1-rev28, 7.10.2-rev22, 7.10.3-rev7
Vendor notification: 2020-01-27
Solution date: 2020-03-06
Public disclosure: 2020-06-12
Researcher Credits: Johannes Moritz
CVE reference: CVE-2020-8543
CVSS: 5.3 CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:L

Vulnerability Details:
Resource exhaustion can be triggered by using pre-authenticated API requests with excessive \
parameter length.

Risk:
Degradation of availability and response times due to excessive resource usage while processing \
request parameters.

Steps to reproduce:
1. Use the /api/defer endpoint and use huge request parameters repeatedly.

Solution:
We now limit and filter request parameter size to avoid denial of service vectors.

---

Internal reference: DOCS-1658 (Bug ID)
Vulnerability type: Improper Restriction of XML External Entity (CWE-611)
Vulnerable version: 7.10.3 and earlier
Vulnerable component: documentconverter
Report confidence: Confirmed
Solution status: Fixed by Vendor
Fixed version: 7.10.1-rev6, 7.10.2-rev5, 7.10.3-rev5
Vendor notification: 2020-01-22
Solution date: 2020-03-06
Public disclosure: 2020-06-12
Researcher credits: Hasan Ali
CVE reference: CVE-2020-8541
CVSS: 7.7 CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:N/A:N

Vulnerability Details:
XML Entity Expansion can be use to trigger HTTP requests to remote servers and include local \
files.

Risk:
Internal network topology and local files might get exposed, server-side requests can be \
triggered by unauthorized users.

Steps to reproduce:
1. Create and upload a malicious OpenXML document
2. Edit or open the document

Solution:
We now use the correct XML stream reader with additional hardening when unmarshalling this kind \
of files.

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