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List:       full-disclosure
Subject:    [FD] Dell Customer Connect 1.3.28.0 Privilege Escalation
From:       Kacper Szurek <kacperszurek () gmail ! com>
Date:       2017-04-25 7:58:55
Message-ID: CACoXDXiuR057=QOMbE0xUX-vgKVgYMfXqM9QzseTr1rc6v=BCg () mail ! gmail ! com
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# Exploit Dell Customer Connect 1.3.28.0 Privilege Escalation
# Date: 25.04.2017
# Software Link: http://www.dell.com/
# Exploit Author: Kacper Szurek
# Contact: https://twitter.com/KacperSzurek
# Website: https://security.szurek.pl/
# Category: local

1. Description

DCCService.exe is running on autostart as System.

This service has auto update functionality.

Basically it periodically checks https://otbs.azurewebsites.net
looking for new config file.

Under normal conditions we cannot spoof this connection because it's SSL.

But here WebUtils.sendWebRequest() is executed using
Impersonator.RunImpersonated().

RunImpersonated() executes given function in the context of currently
logged in user.

In Windows system we can add any certificate to Local user root store.

Then this certificate is considered as trusted so we can perform MITM attack.

It can be done using simple proxy server because by default .NET
HttpWebRequest() uses IE proxy settings (which can by set by any user
without administrator priveleges).

https://security.szurek.pl/dell-customer-connect-13280-privilege-escalation.html

2. Proof of Concept

https://github.com/kacperszurek/exploits/blob/master/DellCustomerConnect/dell_customer_connect_privilege_escalation.py


3. Fix

http://www.dell.com/support/home/us/en/19/Drivers/DriversDetails?driverId=DR53F

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