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List:       full-disclosure
Subject:    Re: [Full-disclosure] The email that hacks you
From:       aditya <nauty.me04 () gmail ! com>
Date:       2012-11-28 12:56:06
Message-ID: CAH4bqJNXo6jWUfypxH=O2gmw5Bkte1H4MQDQUU96wAUzNXo42Q () mail ! gmail ! com
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Please if you could share the code, I would like to test it for my router
as well.

Thanks

On Wed, Nov 28, 2012 at 6:02 PM, Bogdan Calin <bogdan@acunetix.com> wrote:

> Thanks aditya,
>
> The code is not published on the blog post but it's visible in the video.
> It's very simple to reproduce this problem.
>
> On 11/28/2012 1:53 PM, aditya wrote:
> > I totally agree with Christian, it is as insane as passing username and
> passwords using GET
> > requests. But congrats Bogdan for the bringing to us a nice hack.
> >
> > Have u shared the code as well Bogdan?
> >
> > On Wed, Nov 28, 2012 at 5:07 PM, Christian Sciberras <uuf6429@gmail.com<mailto:
> uuf6429@gmail.com>>
> > wrote:
> >
> >     From an architectural perspective, "auto logins" or whatever they're
> called should work through
> >     a random string, just as most providers already do.
> >     There is absolutely no reason to pass the username/password from a
> URL, especially when in plain
> >     text as in these cases.
> >     Since there is no loss of features (there are safer, saner, sensible
> alternatives), I think this
> >     is better considered a bug, since it is never actually needed in the
> first place.
> >
> >     Also, with the random token system, I think it is best to still
> require the user/pass when the
> >     URL the user is directed to is going to do something such as
> modifying/updating stuff.
> >
> >
> >     Chris.
> >
> >
> >
> >     On Wed, Nov 28, 2012 at 12:15 PM, Bogdan Calin <bogdan@acunetix.com
> >     <mailto:bogdan@acunetix.com>> wrote:
> >
> >         Yes, I agree with you.
> >
> >         However, my opinion it that it should be fixed once and for all
> in iOS/Webkit (and the other
> >         browsers) by disabling resources loaded with credentials.
> >
> >         At some point, as a protection for phishing, URLs with the format
> >         scheme://username:password@hostname/ were disabled.
> >         When you enter in the browser bar something like that it doesn't
> work in most browsers.
> >
> >         I was surprised to see that doing something like <image
> >         src='scheme://username:password@hostname/path'> works in Chrome
> and Firefox but if you enter the
> >         same URL in the browser bar it doesn't work. This doesn't work
> in Internet Explorer, which
> >         is the
> >         right behavior in my opinion.
> >
> >         I don't see any good reason why something like this should work.
> Closing this in browsers
> >         will solve
> >         this problem once and for all.
> >
> >         On 11/28/2012 1:00 PM, Guifre wrote:
> >         > Hello,
> >         >
> >         > "I can also confirm that this attack works on iPhone, iPad and
> Mac's
> >         > default mail client."
> >         >
> >         > Of course, it works anywhere where arbitrary client-side code
> can be
> >         > executed... IMAHO, the issue here is not your iphone loading
> images,
> >         > there are millions of attack vectors to trigger this attack...
> The
> >         > problem is the CSRF weaknesses of your router admin panel that
> should
> >         > be fixed by synchronizing a secret token or by using any other
> well
> >         > known mitigation strategy against these attacks.
> >         >
> >         > Best Regards,
> >         > Guifre.
> >         >
> >
> >         --
> >         Bogdan Calin - bogdan [at] acunetix.com <http://acunetix.com>
> >         CTO
> >         Acunetix Ltd. - http://www.acunetix.com
> >         Acunetix Web Security Blog - http://www.acunetix.com/blog
> >         Follow us on Twitter - http://www.twitter.com/acunetix
> >
> >         _______________________________________________
> >         Full-Disclosure - We believe in it.
> >         Charter: http://lists.grok.org.uk/full-disclosure-charter.html
> >         Hosted and sponsored by Secunia - http://secunia.com/
> >
> >
> >
> >     _______________________________________________
> >     Full-Disclosure - We believe in it.
> >     Charter: http://lists.grok.org.uk/full-disclosure-charter.html
> >     Hosted and sponsored by Secunia - http://secunia.com/
> >
> >
> >
> >
> > --
> > Regards
> > Aditya Balapure
> >
> >
>
> --
> Bogdan Calin - bogdan [at] acunetix.com
> CTO
> Acunetix Ltd. - http://www.acunetix.com
> Acunetix Web Security Blog - http://www.acunetix.com/blog
> Follow us on Twitter - http://www.twitter.com/acunetix
>



-- 
Regards
Aditya Balapure

[Attachment #5 (text/html)]

Please if you could share the code, I would like to test it for my router as \
well.<div><br></div><div>Thanks<br><br><div class="gmail_quote">On Wed, Nov 28, 2012 at 6:02 \
PM, Bogdan Calin <span dir="ltr">&lt;<a href="mailto:bogdan@acunetix.com" \
target="_blank">bogdan@acunetix.com</a>&gt;</span> wrote:<br> <blockquote class="gmail_quote" \
style="margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex">Thanks aditya,<br> <br>
The code is not published on the blog post but it&#39;s visible in the video.<br>
It&#39;s very simple to reproduce this problem.<br>
<div class="im"><br>
On 11/28/2012 1:53 PM, aditya wrote:<br>
&gt; I totally agree with Christian, it is as insane as passing username and passwords using \
GET<br> &gt; requests. But congrats Bogdan for the bringing to us a nice hack.<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt; Have u shared the code as well Bogdan?<br>
&gt;<br>
</div>&gt; On Wed, Nov 28, 2012 at 5:07 PM, Christian Sciberras &lt;<a \
href="mailto:uuf6429@gmail.com">uuf6429@gmail.com</a> &lt;mailto:<a \
href="mailto:uuf6429@gmail.com">uuf6429@gmail.com</a>&gt;&gt;<br> <div class="im">&gt; \
wrote:<br> &gt;<br>
&gt;     From an architectural perspective, &quot;auto logins&quot; or whatever they&#39;re \
called should work through<br> &gt;     a random string, just as most providers already do.<br>
&gt;     There is absolutely no reason to pass the username/password from a URL, especially \
when in plain<br> &gt;     text as in these cases.<br>
&gt;     Since there is no loss of features (there are safer, saner, sensible alternatives), I \
think this<br> &gt;     is better considered a bug, since it is never actually needed in the \
first place.<br> &gt;<br>
&gt;     Also, with the random token system, I think it is best to still require the user/pass \
when the<br> &gt;     URL the user is directed to is going to do something such as \
modifying/updating stuff.<br> &gt;<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt;     Chris.<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt;     On Wed, Nov 28, 2012 at 12:15 PM, Bogdan Calin &lt;<a \
href="mailto:bogdan@acunetix.com">bogdan@acunetix.com</a><br> </div><div><div class="h5">&gt;   \
&lt;mailto:<a href="mailto:bogdan@acunetix.com">bogdan@acunetix.com</a>&gt;&gt; wrote:<br> \
&gt;<br> &gt;         Yes, I agree with you.<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt;         However, my opinion it that it should be fixed once and for all in iOS/Webkit (and \
the other<br> &gt;         browsers) by disabling resources loaded with credentials.<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt;         At some point, as a protection for phishing, URLs with the format<br>
&gt;         scheme://username:password@hostname/ were disabled.<br>
&gt;         When you enter in the browser bar something like that it doesn&#39;t work in most \
browsers.<br> &gt;<br>
&gt;         I was surprised to see that doing something like &lt;image<br>
&gt;         src=&#39;scheme://username:password@hostname/path&#39;&gt; works in Chrome and \
Firefox but if you enter the<br> &gt;         same URL in the browser bar it doesn&#39;t work. \
This doesn&#39;t work in Internet Explorer, which<br> &gt;         is the<br>
&gt;         right behavior in my opinion.<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt;         I don&#39;t see any good reason why something like this should work. Closing this \
in browsers<br> &gt;         will solve<br>
&gt;         this problem once and for all.<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt;         On 11/28/2012 1:00 PM, Guifre wrote:<br>
&gt;         &gt; Hello,<br>
&gt;         &gt;<br>
&gt;         &gt; &quot;I can also confirm that this attack works on iPhone, iPad and \
Mac&#39;s<br> &gt;         &gt; default mail client.&quot;<br>
&gt;         &gt;<br>
&gt;         &gt; Of course, it works anywhere where arbitrary client-side code can be<br>
&gt;         &gt; executed... IMAHO, the issue here is not your iphone loading images,<br>
&gt;         &gt; there are millions of attack vectors to trigger this attack... The<br>
&gt;         &gt; problem is the CSRF weaknesses of your router admin panel that should<br>
&gt;         &gt; be fixed by synchronizing a secret token or by using any other well<br>
&gt;         &gt; known mitigation strategy against these attacks.<br>
&gt;         &gt;<br>
&gt;         &gt; Best Regards,<br>
&gt;         &gt; Guifre.<br>
&gt;         &gt;<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt;         --<br>
</div></div>&gt;         Bogdan Calin - bogdan [at] <a href="http://acunetix.com" \
target="_blank">acunetix.com</a> &lt;<a href="http://acunetix.com" \
target="_blank">http://acunetix.com</a>&gt;<br> <div class="HOEnZb"><div class="h5">&gt;        \
CTO<br> &gt;         Acunetix Ltd. - <a href="http://www.acunetix.com" \
target="_blank">http://www.acunetix.com</a><br> &gt;         Acunetix Web Security Blog - <a \
href="http://www.acunetix.com/blog" target="_blank">http://www.acunetix.com/blog</a><br> &gt;   \
Follow us on Twitter - <a href="http://www.twitter.com/acunetix" \
target="_blank">http://www.twitter.com/acunetix</a><br> &gt;<br>
&gt;         _______________________________________________<br>
&gt;         Full-Disclosure - We believe in it.<br>
&gt;         Charter: <a href="http://lists.grok.org.uk/full-disclosure-charter.html" \
target="_blank">http://lists.grok.org.uk/full-disclosure-charter.html</a><br> &gt;         \
Hosted and sponsored by Secunia - <a href="http://secunia.com/" \
target="_blank">http://secunia.com/</a><br> &gt;<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt;     _______________________________________________<br>
&gt;     Full-Disclosure - We believe in it.<br>
&gt;     Charter: <a href="http://lists.grok.org.uk/full-disclosure-charter.html" \
target="_blank">http://lists.grok.org.uk/full-disclosure-charter.html</a><br> &gt;     Hosted \
and sponsored by Secunia - <a href="http://secunia.com/" \
target="_blank">http://secunia.com/</a><br> &gt;<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt; --<br>
&gt; Regards<br>
&gt; Aditya Balapure<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt;<br>
<br>
--<br>
Bogdan Calin - bogdan [at] <a href="http://acunetix.com" target="_blank">acunetix.com</a><br>
CTO<br>
Acunetix Ltd. - <a href="http://www.acunetix.com" \
target="_blank">http://www.acunetix.com</a><br> Acunetix Web Security Blog - <a \
href="http://www.acunetix.com/blog" target="_blank">http://www.acunetix.com/blog</a><br> Follow \
us on Twitter - <a href="http://www.twitter.com/acunetix" \
target="_blank">http://www.twitter.com/acunetix</a><br> </div></div></blockquote></div><br><br \
clear="all"><div><br></div>-- <br>Regards<div>Aditya Balapure</div><div><br></div><br> </div>



_______________________________________________
Full-Disclosure - We believe in it.
Charter: http://lists.grok.org.uk/full-disclosure-charter.html
Hosted and sponsored by Secunia - http://secunia.com/

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