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List: full-disclosure
Subject: [Full-disclosure] GSC Voice Server Denial of Service Vulnerability
From: "Michael J. Gray" <mooseous () gmail ! com>
Date: 2011-09-29 10:22:21
Message-ID: 007b01cc7e91$ad919a20$08b4ce60$ () gmail ! com
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Product: GSC (Game Servers Client)
Version: 2.00 Build 3017
Website: http://getgsc.com
By inspecting the network traffic of messages to voice servers one can see
that ASCII strings are prefixed with their length as a 32-bit signed
integer. Simply modifying this to any length in excess of the actual
string's length will cause a denial of service to that voice server by
crashing it. This may be a precursor to a buffer overflow vulnerability, but
it appears not to be exploitable in this way at this time.
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class=WordSection1><p class=MsoNormal>Product: GSC (Game Servers Client)<o:p></o:p></p><p \
class=MsoNormal>Version: 2.00 Build 3017<o:p></o:p></p><p class=MsoNormal>Website: <a \
href="http://getgsc.com">http://getgsc.com</a><o:p></o:p></p><p \
class=MsoNormal><o:p> </o:p></p><p class=MsoNormal>By inspecting the network traffic of \
messages to voice servers one can see that ASCII strings are prefixed with their length as a \
32-bit signed integer. Simply modifying this to any length in excess of the actual \
string’s length will cause a denial of service to that voice server by crashing it. This \
may be a precursor to a buffer overflow vulnerability, but it appears not to be exploitable in \
this way at this time. <o:p></o:p></p></div></body></html>
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