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List:       fedora-devel-list
Subject:    Re: Restricting automounting of uncommon filesystems?
From:       Leon Fauster via devel <devel () lists ! fedoraproject ! org>
Date:       2023-07-24 16:06:47
Message-ID: 053923bf-9f10-e913-8f0c-126dd29dda8a () gmail ! com
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Am 23.07.23 um 09:35 schrieb Vitaly Zaitsev via devel:
> On 22/07/2023 08:01, Matthew Garrett wrote:
>> 1) Automounting of removable media exposes the kernel to a lot of
>> untrusted input
> 
> Disable automatic mount by default. Problem solved.
> 


We use a whitelist approach here based
on usbguard daemon (hw centered), and

# cat /etc/dconf/db/local.d/s-media-automount
[org/gnome/desktop/media-handling]
automount=false
automount-open=false

Our scenario is clearly modelled around an user
in front of a GUI. So, it tackles it in different
layers and the actual fs attack vector is not addressed.

Should a "middleware" based on guestmount just check
for the integrity of the fs or keeping it in such
sandbox?

-- 
Leon








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