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List:       cypherpunks
Subject:    Re: [p2p-hackers] Pirate Pay
From:       Eugen Leitl <eugen () leitl ! org>
Date:       2012-05-15 12:22:45
Message-ID: 20120515122245.GS17120 () leitl ! org
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----- Forwarded message from Tom Ritter <tom@ritter.vg> -----

From: Tom Ritter <tom@ritter.vg>
Date: Mon, 14 May 2012 23:16:28 -0400
To: theory and practice of decentralized computer networks <p2p-hackers@lists.zooko.com>
Subject: Re: [p2p-hackers] Pirate Pay
Reply-To: theory and practice of decentralized computer networks <p2p-hackers@lists.zooko.com>

On 14 May 2012 18:48, James A. Donald <jamesd@echeque.com> wrote:
> Some design characteristics:
>
> *.  Peers are identified by a durable public key.
>
> *.  Peers interact with keys they do not trust, but expect protocol
> conformance and prosocial behavior only from keys they trust. Peers limit
> their exposure to non trusted keys so that they can suffer only limited
> damage from non trusted keys deviating from protocol or otherwise
> misbehaving.
>
> *.  Peers may not only trust Bob, but transitively everyone Bob trusts, and
> everyone that those peers trust ...  If this works, they increase their
> transitive trust in Bob, if it fails they decrease their transitive trust.
>
> *.  Prosocial behavior consists of conforming to protocol, storage
> availability, with valuable, or at least demanded, stuff in storage and
> accessible on demand,  and paying ones bandwidth and storage debts. Since
> networks are unreliable, perfect protocol conformity is never expected or
> demanded, but the burden that one's deviations from protocol place on other
> peers counts against one's karma.

Hm.  I'm not sure how to bootstrap when you only want to interact with
people you trust - but it seems like this could be a model for a Web
of Trust that grows over time if you have a way to validate what
people are supposed to be sending.

I am Alice and I interact with 1000 other people, Bobs1-1000, who send
me pieces of a file. They're valid, so I sign their public keys saying
they were good for some number of bytes, send them the signature, but
also keep it locally. I send data to 50 other people, Carols1-50 who
in turn give me signatures.  Over time, I interact with Bob50 again,
and trust him based on my previous signature. I find a Dave, who I
trust a little because he has a signature from Bob600, and Bob600 was
good to me.

The key pieces (and why this couldn't work for distributed DNS) are
that I know that Bob[x] sent me is valid because I have the
information to build a merkle tree and validate his piece.  The more I
download, the more people I 'trust' because they were honest actors
last time. The more I upload, the more people 'trust' me because I
acted honestly in the past.

But I may have reinvented something simple or missed an obvious flaw,
because I'm not well-versed in how DHT works, or anything published in
this area.

-tom
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----- End forwarded message -----
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Eugen* Leitl <a href="http://leitl.org">leitl</a> http://leitl.org
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