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List:       cryptography-randombit
Subject:    Re: [cryptography] Satoshi Nakamoto's 2015 unbreakable signature algorith
From:       "Wyss, Felix" <Felix.Wyss () inin ! com>
Date:       2015-12-29 2:09:38
Message-ID: CY1PR0501MB15795D54AC379CDD2931AEB8EBFC0 () CY1PR0501MB1579 ! namprd05 ! prod ! outlook ! com
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Isn't a problem with this that the private key can only be used to sign one message as otherwise more intermediate values for different bit patterns are revealed--and then I can forge all the downstream ones. In the extreme case, if I have two messages where the digest differs in the first bit, I have A, B and C.  That also means that technically only B or C are really "private" as A and (B or C) are pushed as part of the signature. 

--Felix

________________________________________
From: cryptography <cryptography-bounces@randombit.net> on behalf of ianG <iang@iang.org>
Sent: Monday, December 28, 2015 20:47
To: cryptography@randombit.net
Subject: Re: [cryptography] Satoshi Nakamoto's 2015 unbreakable signature algorith

On 28/12/2015 13:03 pm, Wilson Ross wrote:
>
>> Satoshi Nakamoto
>> Hash Tube Signature Scheme
>> satoshin@gmx.com
>> 25.12.2015
>
>> Abstract.  A Hash Tube signature scheme is proposed, with an explanation how
>> the individual tube levels are built. The signature and verification procedures
>> on this virtual object are introduced. This scheme is applied to the signing of
>> a cryptographic payments. Methods how the approach mitigates the double spend
>> risk are evaluated in a practical retail-like use cases.

Can we at least post some links?

https://www.docdroid.net/mR3fUNS/paper.pdf.html

is apparently where 1st 2 pages are.

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