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List:       cryptography
Subject:    [Cryptography] vault1317/signal-dakez: An authenticated key exchange protocol with a public key conc
From:       "ROOT () HardenedVault" <root () hardenedvault ! net>
Date:       2020-08-31 12:36:45
Message-ID: 4G4m7N5SOviwQYphqo804sVB6dyoV3cat0Gv5q3F_f6qKTTxuC5s04GmgjTsR8USef1NJL99Y0-uDnxgD8HbP9mO37FTCyqwYs0VEYHDL9M= () hardenedvault ! net
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Hey!

A deniable authenticated key exchange can establish a secure communication channel \
while leaving no cryptographic evidence of communication. Some well-designed protocol \
today, even in the case of betrayal by some participants and disclosure of long-term \
key materials, cannot leave any cryptographic evidence. However, this is no longer \
enough: If "Big data" technology is used to analyse data fetched from pivotal nodes, \
it's not difficult to register your identity through your long-term public keys. \
(although it can't be a solid evidence due to deniability) In this article, we have \
analysed the advantages and disadvantages of existing solutions which are claimed to \
be deniable to some degree, and proposed an authenticated key exchange protocol that \
is able to conceal the public keys from the outside of the secure channel, and \
deniable to some degree, and a reference implementation is provided.

If you are still interested in the full version of paper, please read it via( noted \
it's an onion site):

http://4o7umzlwx7unb64vgnqj4yhwtlqmlnyx3gawayfni623hqqw5buy5pid.onion/vault1317-signal-dakez


Or draft pdf( won't be updated) in internet:
https://github.com/hardenedvault/vault1317/raw/master/vault1317.pdf

Sorry to interrupt if you don't care about deniablity.

regards
ROOT@HardenedVault


[Attachment #5 (text/html)]

<div>Hey!<br></div><p>A deniable authenticated key exchange can establish a secure
communication channel while leaving no cryptographic evidence of
communication. Some well-designed protocol today, even in the case of
betrayal by some participants and disclosure of long-term key materials,
 cannot leave any cryptographic evidence. However, this is no longer
enough: If "Big data" technology is used to analyse data fetched from
pivotal nodes, it's not difficult to register your identity through your
 long-term public keys. (although it can't be a solid evidence due to
deniability) In this article, we have analysed the advantages and
disadvantages of existing solutions which are claimed to be deniable to
some degree, and proposed an authenticated key exchange protocol that is
 able to conceal the public keys from the outside of the secure channel,
 and deniable to some degree, and a reference implementation is
provided.<br></p><p>If you are still interested in the full version of paper, please \
read it via( noted it's an onion site):<br></p><div><a \
href="http://4o7umzlwx7unb64vgnqj4yhwtlqmlnyx3gawayfni623hqqw5buy5pid.onion/vault1317- \
signal-dakez">http://4o7umzlwx7unb64vgnqj4yhwtlqmlnyx3gawayfni623hqqw5buy5pid.onion/vault1317-signal-dakez</a><br></div><div><br></div><div>Or \
draft pdf( won't be updated) in internet:<br></div><div><a \
href="https://github.com/hardenedvault/vault1317/raw/master/vault1317.pdf">https://git \
hub.com/hardenedvault/vault1317/raw/master/vault1317.pdf</a><br></div><div><br></div><div>Sorry \
to interrupt if you don't care about deniablity.<br></div><div><br></div><div \
class="protonmail_signature_block"><div \
class="protonmail_signature_block-user"><div>regards<br></div><div>ROOT@HardenedVault<br></div></div><div \
class="protonmail_signature_block-proton \
protonmail_signature_block-empty"><br></div></div><div><br></div>



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