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List:       cryptography
Subject:    [Cryptography] Question about crypto_sign_open (in tweetnacl.c)
From:       Patrick Chkoreff <pc () fexl ! com>
Date:       2018-10-27 14:55:33
Message-ID: 9938ed51-d33b-4738-d35c-0c85faaa8b72 () fexl ! com
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I wrote:

> I noticed an intriguing technique used in crypto_sign_open in
> tweetnacl.c.  On line 790 we have:
> 
>   FOR(i,n) m[i] = sm[i];
> 
> That's straightforward.  After that loop, m consists of the 64 byte
> signature followed by the (64-n) byte message that was signed.  But then
> watch this on line 791:
> 
>   FOR(i,32) m[i+32] = pk[i];
> 
> That loop overwrites the last 16 bytes of the signature with the first
> 16 bytes of the public key, and overwrites the first 16 bytes of the
> message with the last 16 bytes of the public key.

Sorry, I misinterpreted that loop.  It overwrites the last 32 bytes of
the 64-byte signature with the contents of the 32-byte public key,
period.  It does not overwrite the message at all.


-- Patrick
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