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List:       cryptography
Subject:    RE: more on malicious hardware
From:       "Scott Guthery" <sbg () acw ! com>
Date:       2008-04-28 1:13:30
Message-ID: 002f01c8a8cd$12d6d3d0$6901a8c0 () BigDell
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>>Adding a backdoor to chips is a different story, though, since that would
require cutting a second set of masks. 
>>I am assuming that there must be no backdoor in the legitimately produced
chips since the client would detect 
>>it as a slight violation of some of their timing simulations. The client
also often inspects the masks before 
>>the chips are produced and basically reverse-engineers the whole chip on
that level.

A backdoor -- hardware or software -- in a smart card or TPM would be
difficult to detect by either of these means.  In the case that nation A is
buying these from nation F, don't you think that nation F would be motivated
to slip in a couple extra lines of code or a couple extra 100 gates just in
case?  If A got into a tangle with C, F would in a very strong position.  

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