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List:       cfrg
Subject:    [CFRG] New draft on Key Blinding for Signature Schemes
From:       Christopher Wood <caw () heapingbits ! net>
Date:       2022-03-08 17:19:24
Message-ID: 00A27281-FD79-4D42-BCB8-2ADA7904636D () heapingbits ! net
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Hi folks,

We just published a new draft entitled, "Key Blinding for Signature Schemes," with \
the following high-level objective:

> This document describes extensions to existing signature schemes for
> key blinding.  This functionality guarantees that a blinded public
> key and all signatures produced using the blinded key pair are
> unlinkable to the unblinded key pair.  Moreover, signatures produced
> using blinded key pairs are indistinguishable from signatures
> produced using unblinded key pairs.

You can find the source here:

   https://github.com/chris-wood/draft-dew-cfrg-signature-key-blinding

Key blinding has been in use for quite some time, notably in the context of Tor [1]. \
This draft specifies functionality using _private_ key blinds for EdDSA and ECDSA. \
Its intended purpose is for a variant of Privacy Pass, described in [2]. Note that \
there are some interesting connections to related-key attacks on signature schemes \
[3]. As such, security analysis for the extensions contained in this document is \
underway to ensure they're safe. 

We'd like time on the agenda in IETF 113 to present this work to CFRG. In particular, \
we'd like to know if this is something the RG is interested in adopting as a work \
item.

I'm happy to answer any questions about the draft between now and then. Otherwise, \
see you at IETF 113!

Best,
Chris

[1] https://www-users.cse.umn.edu/~hoppernj/basic-proof.pdf 
[2] https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-privacypass-rate-limit-tokens/
[3] https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-30840-1_2
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