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List:       cap-talk
Subject:    [cap-talk] Why no DSR?
From:       "James A. Donald" <jamesd () echeque ! com>
Date:       2009-07-06 2:39:03
Message-ID: 4A5163C7.5030702 () echeque ! com
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Mark Miller wrote:
 > I do think that DSR or other such agoric bandwidth
 > allocation systems can provide good defenses against
 > DDOS. In the absence of legacy compatibility
 > constraints, I believe they are straightforwardly
 > technically achievable. But I do not believe they are
 > politically possible anytime in the foreseeable
 > future.

DSR assumes good enough physical privacy and
authenticity - router Bob knows that a particular
message came from router Carol, because that particular
wire is attached to Router Carol and not attached to the
rest of the world except through Router Carol.

DSR also only has to do fast low cost transactions with
a small number of trusted sites - long distance
transactions are built up of many local transactions.

Thus you cannot usefully connect DSR up to a system that
assumes pipes to the cloud, and charges by the size of
the pipe.  For DSR to come in, in would have to come in
some small area, and that area grow.

DSR requires a final settlement mechanism, for larger
and less frequent transactions conducted between
entities not physically connected, for distant and
untrusted entities, a long distance settlement
mechanism.  Since the government would find it difficult
to track who owned and controlled every router and every
network card, such a system is equivalent to a swiss
numbered back account key in every router and every
network card.

Thus cypherpunk revolution is a necessary precondition
for DSR.
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